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By Manuel Bagues, Mauro Sylos-Labini, and Natalia Zinovyeva∗
We analyze how a larger presence of female evaluators affects
committee decision-making using information on 100,000 applica-
tions to associate and full professorships in Italy and Spain. These
applications were assessed by 8,000 randomly selected evaluators.
A larger number of women in evaluation committees does not in-
crease either the quantity or the quality of female candidates who
qualify. Information from individual voting reports suggests that
female evaluators are not significantly more favorable towards fe-
male candidates. At the same time, male evaluators become less
favorable towards female candidates as soon as a female evaluator
joins the committee.
JEL: J71, J16
Keywords: Scientific committees, gender discrimination, random-
ized natural experiment.
The underrepresentation of women in academia remains a cause for concern
among universities and policy makers around the world. In Europe, women ac-
count for 47 percent of PhD graduates, 37 percent of associate professors and
only a mere 21 percent of full professors (European Commission, 2016). Similar
patterns may be observed in the US and the gender imbalance is even larger in
Japan (National Research Council, 2009, Abe, 2012).
Several explanations may account for the lack of women in high-level positions.
According to the pipeline theory, once women have entered the lower rungs of
the academic career it is mainly a matter of time that they would move their
way through a metaphorical pipeline to reach high-level jobs. However, in most
disciplines, the share of women among faculty members remains low even after
decades of improved recruitment of women at the undergraduate and the doc-
toral level (Ginther and Kahn, 2004, 2009). Gender differences in promotion
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rates might also reflect differences in productivity, perhaps due to the existence
of gendered roles at the household level or the lack of female mentors and role
models (Blau et al., 2010). Some women may also devote excessive time to tasks
that are socially desirable but which are not taken into account in promotion
decisions (Vesterlund, Babcock and Weingart, 2014). Furthermore, some authors
have pointed out that women are less likely to apply for promotions (Bosquet,
Combes and Garcia-Pen˜alosa, 2013, De Paola, Ponzo and Scoppa, 2015), perhaps
due to the existence of gender differences in the preference for competitive envi-
ronments (Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007, Buser, Niederle and Oosterbeek, 2014)
or in bargaining abilities in the labour market (Babcock et al., 2006, Blackaby,
Booth and Frank, 2005).
Beyond these supply-side explanations, the slow progress made by women has
been sometimes attributed to the lack of female evaluators in the committees
which decide on hiring and promotions. In this paper we examine whether the
presence of women in scientific committees might help to increase the chances
of success of female candidates and to improve the quality of the evaluations.
There are several reasons for considering this hypothesis. First, there is evidence
of gender segregation across different scientific subfields (Dolado, Felgueroso and
Almunia, 2012, Hale and Regev, 2014). If men and women tend to do research
in different subfields and evaluators overrate the importance of their own types
of research, the lack of female evaluators might be detrimental for female can-
didates (Bagues and Perez-Villadoniga, 2012, 2013). Second, research networks
tend to be gendered (Boschini and Sjo¨gren, 2007, Hilmer and Hilmer, 2007).1
If evaluators are mostly male, male candidates might have a better chance to
be acquainted with committee members and could perhaps benefit from these
connections (Zinovyeva and Bagues, 2015, Bagues, Sylos-Labini and Zinovyeva,
2015). Third, men might hold more negative stereotypes of women than other
women do or they may be biased against women reaching high-level positions. For
instance, according to the World Value Survey, around 25 percent of US males
believe that men make better political leaders and 16 percent think than men
make better business executives. Women are half as likely to hold such views.
A similar pattern is observed in Europe.2 According to some authors, similar
biases are also present in the academic world.3 Fourth, the presence of women in
1Boschini and Sjo¨gren (2007) show that coauthoring is not gender neutral in Economics. Hilmer and
Hilmer (2007) observe that in the US 55 percent of the Economics PhD students being advised by women
are female, while only 18 percent of Economics PhD students advised by men are female.
2World Value Survey Wave 6: 2010-2014. Official aggregate v.20140429. World Values Survey Asso-
ciation (www.worldvaluessurvey.org).
3Gender discrimination in academia remains a controversial issue. According to meta-analyses by Ceci
and Williams (2011) and Ceci et al. (2014), the more recent empirical evidence fails to provide any clear
support to the assertions of discrimination in manuscript reviewing, interviewing, and hiring. However,
other studies find that female researchers might still receive lower evaluations than male researchers with
identical characteristics (Steinpreis, Anders and Ritzke, 1999, Moss-Racusin et al., 2012). Some experts
in gender studies have also argued that male evaluators discriminate against female candidates. For
instance, in a report commissioned by the European Commission, the expert group Women In Research
Decision Making concludes that “(a)t the very least, having male only committees risks replicating
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evaluation committees might also improve the quality of the evaluation. It has
been argued that group performance is positively correlated with the proportion
of women in a group (Woolley et al., 2010). The presence of women in scientific
boards might not only help to achieve gender balance in the academic profession,
but it can also make science more meritocratic and invigorate its progress.
These arguments seem to have reached policy makers. A number of countries
have introduced quotas requiring that scientific committees be at least 40 percent
female (and male) and many universities and scientific institutions have their own
internal guidelines ensuring the presence of both genders in committees.4 How-
ever, despite the increasing popularity of gender quotas in scientific committees,
there are concerns about their effectiveness. Quotas are costly for senior female
researchers, as they increase disproportionately the amount of time that they
have to devote to evaluation committees (Vernos, 2013). Furthermore, a larger
presence of women in committees may not necessarily benefit female candidates.
Both men and women have developed their careers in an academic environment
dominated by men, and both genders may tend to associate important academic
positions, and the features they require, with men, not with women (Me´ndez and
Busenbark, 2015). And even if women are relatively more sympathetic towards
female candidates, they may not have equal levels of voice and authority in delib-
eration processes (Karpowitz, Mendelberg and Shaker, 2012, Brescoll, 2011). The
presence of women in the committee can also induce male evaluators to be less
favorable towards female candidates. Past research on group dynamics suggests
that men might not respond favorably to the presence of gender diversity, partic-
ularly in domains that men have historically dominated (Crocker and McGraw,
1984). Female evaluators can also contribute to strengthen male identity (Akerlof
and Kranton, 2000) or they can trigger a licensing effect (Monin and Miller, 2001,
Khan and Dhar, 2006).
A better understanding of the impact of scientific committees’ gender com-
position on recruitment and promotion decisions is crucial in order to determine
whether quotas are desirable. The empirical evidence has been so far inconclusive
and typically based on small samples. Sometimes researchers seem to benefit from
the presence of evaluators who share the same gender (Casadevall and Handels-
man, 2014, De Paola and Scoppa, 2015), sometimes they seem to obtain relatively
stereotypes and bias, both regarding applicants and issues in research” (European Commission, 2008,
page 27). Another expert report on the situation of women researchers in Spain asserts that “there
are prejudices about women among those who co-opt, promote or have the key to promotion. The
bodies which control this are mostly male and, even if they are not totally conscious of it, they see an
academic woman first as a woman and secondly as a colleague.” (Fundacio´n Espan˜ola para la Ciencia
y la Tecnolog´ıa, 2005, page 48). Other researchers have voiced similar views (Bagilhole, 2005, Barres,
2006, Smith et al., 2015).
4Gender quotas in scientific committees were introduced in 1995 in Finland (amendment of the
Act on Equality between Women and Men, Act No. 624/1992 and No. 206/1995.), in 2007 in Spain
(Constitutional Act 3/2007 of 22 March for Effective Equality between Women and Men) and in 2014
in France (decree No. 2014-997, September 2 2014). The European Commission has also committed
to reaching a target of 40 percent female participation in its advisory structures for Horizon 2020, the
European Union’s research and innovation programme for 2014-20.
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better evaluations from opposite-sex evaluators (Broder, 1993, Ellemers et al.,
2004), and in some other cases gender does not seem to play any (statistically)
significant role (Abrevaya and Hamermesh, 2012, Jayasinghe, Marsh and Bond,
2003, Milkman, Akinola and Chugh, 2015, Moss-Racusin et al., 2012, Steinpreis,
Anders and Ritzke, 1999, Williams and Ceci, 2015). A brief summary of these
studies is available in Appendix A.5 It is unclear whether these mixed findings
reflect the idiosyncrasies of the different situations and samples analyzed in each
study, or simple random sampling variation. The literature also does not shed
light on the mechanisms through which a higher presence of female evaluators in
committees may benefit female candidates. From a policy perspective, the lack
of more extensive and clear evidence is disappointing.6
In this paper we analyze the role of evaluators’ gender in academic evaluations
using the exceptional evidence provided by two large-scale randomized natural
experiments in two different countries, Italy and Spain. The representation of
women in Italian and Spanish universities is similar to their representation in
other European countries and the US. Despite having achieved parity at the lower
rungs of the academic ladder, women are still underrepresented in top academic
positions. They account for approximately half of new PhD graduates, one third
of associate professors but only one fifth of full professors in both countries.7 The
Spanish and Italian institutional arrangements offer several unique features. In
order to be either promoted or hired by a university at the level of associate or
full professor, researchers are required to first obtain a qualification granted by a
centralized committee at the national level. In these nation-wide examinations,
which are performed periodically in all disciplines in both countries, evaluators
are selected from a pool of eligible professors using a random draw. This allows
us to consistently estimate the causal effect of committees’ gender composition on
evaluations. We also observe extensive and detailed information on evaluators’
and candidates’ research production, academic connections and their subfield of
specialization. We exploit this information to explore the different mechanisms
suggested by the theory about the role of committees’ gender composition. Each
country also offers some comparative advantage in terms of data availability. We
use individual voting reports, available in Italy, to study the voting behavior of
male and female evaluators within each committee. In Spain, we can observe the
5All appendix material can be found in the Online Appendix.
6A related literature also analyses the role of evaluators’ gender in nonacademic occupations (Bagues
and Esteve-Volart, 2010, Bertrand et al., 2014, Booth and Leigh, 2010, Kunze and Miller, 2014), in sport
activities (Sandberg, 2014) or in the lab (Bohnet, van Geen and Bazerman, 2015). In general, in these
studies evaluators’ gender is not relevant, with the exception of Bagues and Esteve-Volart (2010) who
document that female applicants to the Spanish judiciary have lower chances of being hired when they
are randomly assigned to an evaluation committee including women.
7In Italy, women account for 52 percent of new PhD graduates, 36 percent of associate professors,
and 21 percent of full professors (MIUR - Italian Ministry of Education, University and Research, 2016).
In Spain, women account for 49 percent of new PhD graduates, 40 percent of associate professors, and 21
percent of full professors (MECD - Spanish Ministry of Education, Culture and Sports, 2016). According
to information from individuals who obtained a PhD in the 90s in Spain, female graduates are half as
likely to attain full professorship than male graduates (Sa´nchez de Madariaga, de la Rica and Dolado,
2011).
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future productivity of promoted candidates. We use this information to examine
the quality of the assessments granted by committees with different gender com-
positions. As we explain in more detail in section I, there exist also a number of
interesting institutional differences between the evaluation processes in the two
countries. Having data for the two different institutional arrangements allows us
to cross-validate the findings and to explore their robustness.
Our database includes information on all qualification exams that were con-
ducted in Italy in years 2012-2014 and in Spain in years 2002-2006. Overall,
these evaluations involved approximately 100,000 applications and 8,000 evalua-
tors in all disciplines. Evaluation committees, which include five members in Italy
and seven members in Spain, are composed mostly by men. Approximately one
third of evaluation committees do not include any women, in one third there is
just one female evaluator, and in one third of committees there are two or more
women, but very rarely we observe a female majority.
In both countries male applicants tend to be more successful than female ap-
plicants. In Italy, approximately 38 percent of men receive a positive evaluation,
compared to 35 percent of women. In Spain, 12 percent of male applicants qualify,
while the success rate among female applicants is equal to 11 percent. When we
take into account candidates’ observable productivity, the remaining gender gap
is equal to 1.5 percentage points (p.p.) in Italy and 1.4 p.p. in Spain, and it is
statistically significant in both countries. We find no empirical support, neither
from the average in the two countries nor from the majority of subsamples ana-
lyzed, to suggest that the presence of women in evaluation committees decreases
the gender gap in a statistically or economically significant way. On the contrary,
in Italy gender-mixed committees exhibit a significantly larger gender gap than
committees composed only of male evaluators. An extra woman in a committee
of five members increases the gender gap by somewhere between 0.4 and 3.3 p.p.,
considering a 95 percent confidence interval. In the Spanish case, we can reject
any sizable impact. An additional woman in a committee of seven members may
decrease the gender gap by at most 0.5 p.p. or it might also increase it by up to
1 p.p.
We also examine whether committees with a relatively larger proportion of
women promote better candidates, using as a proxy of candidates’ quality their
research output before the evaluation and, in the case of Spain, also their research
output during the following five years. We do not observe any significant differ-
ence in the past or future observable quality of candidates who have qualified in
committees with different gender compositions.
Evidence from 300,000 individual voting reports, available in the case of Italy,
suggests that there are two main factors that explain why female candidates do not
benefit from a larger presence of women in committees. In mixed gender commit-
tees, female evaluators rate female applicants higher than their male colleagues,
but the difference is small and statistically non significant. At the same time, the
presence of female evaluators in committees makes male evaluators tougher upon
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female candidates, perhaps reflecting a licensing effect or male identity priming.
To gain a better understanding of why female evaluators do not exhibit a
stronger same-sex preference and also to determine the validity of our findings
in other contexts, we explore why none of the standard theories predicting that
a larger presence of women in committees helps female candidates plays a major
role in this context. First, we consider the gendered networks hypothesis. As
expected, we find that research networks tend to be gendered in both countries.
Female professors are significantly more likely to have an advisor, a colleague or a
coauthor of the same gender. We also observe that committees tend to favor con-
nected candidates. However, the likelihood of having a connection in a national
committee is relatively low and, therefore, networks have only a limited effect on
the evaluation outcomes. Second, we examine the role of gender segregation across
research subfields. At the level at which evaluations were conducted, around 200
different fields, gender segregation turns out to be relatively small. As a result,
while evaluators tend to prefer candidates with a similar research profile, the im-
pact of gender segregation on evaluations is negligible. Third, we study gender
stereotypes. Stereotypes are expected to be more relevant when evaluators can-
not observe accurately the quality of candidates, for instance because evaluators
and candidates are specialized in different subfields of research. The influence of
stereotypes on evaluation outcomes seems to increase, not decrease, when there
are women in the committee. Finally, we also examine separately evaluations for
high-level positions. Male evaluators might have prejudices against women being
promoted to full professorships, but not to positions at lower levels of the career
ladder. Results are mixed: we find support for this hypothesis in the case of
Spain, but not in the case of Italy.
Our study contributes to the literature in several ways. We provide the first
large-scale assessment of the causal impact of the gender composition of scientific
committees. There is no evidence suggesting that, in the two evaluation sys-
tems considered in this study, female candidates benefit from the presence of a
larger share of women in evaluation committees. We also examine explicitly the
relevance of the different theoretical arguments that have been proposed in the
literature in favor of increasing the share of women in committees. This analysis
helps to assess the external validity of our findings and, as we discuss in detail in
the final section of the paper, it provides a better understanding of when gender
quotas might be desirable. Finally, we open the black box of committee decision-
making and we analyze the voting behavior of individual committee members.
Our findings suggest that interactions within committees might exacerbate the
impact of gender stereotypes.
I. Institutional background
Several European countries have national evaluation systems which are meant
to guarantee the academic quality of professors in public universities. The ev-
idence presented in this paper is based on an analysis of two variants of such
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systems: the Italian system known as Abilitazione Scientifica Nazionale, which
was introduced in 2012, and the Spanish system known as Habilitacio´n, which
was in place between 2002 and 2006.
Both systems require candidates for associate and full professorships to qualify
in national evaluations held by an academic board in the appropriate discipline.
In each country, there are nearly two hundred legally defined academic disciplines,
each corresponding to a certain area of knowledge. Successful candidates can then
apply for a position at a given university. The time line of evaluations has the
following steps. First, a call for applicants is announced in which candidates
can apply for multiple disciplines and positions. When the list of applicants
is settled, committee members are randomly selected from the list of eligible
evaluators in the corresponding discipline. Once the committees are formed, the
evaluation process begins and once this is over, the evaluation results are made
public. Rostered evaluators can potentially resign at any point of the process,
something that happens in 2 percent of cases in Spain and in 8 percent of cases
in Italy. Resigned evaluators are substituted by randomly selected evaluators.
The procedure has also distinctive features specific to each country. In Spain,
evaluations involve oral presentations by the candidates, while in Italy evaluations
are based only on candidates’ CVs and publications. In Spain qualification leads
almost automatically to promotion, while in Italy the chances to get promoted
conditional on obtaining qualification are much lower. The Italian system is
relatively more transparent and exposed to public scrutiny. Nonetheless, in both
systems there seems to be room for subjectivity. For instance, Zinovyeva and
Bagues (2015) and Bagues, Sylos-Labini and Zinovyeva (2015) document that the
presence of a coauthor or a colleague in the evaluation committee has a significant
positive impact on candidates’ chances of success in both countries.
We describe in detail the main features of each system below. This information
is also summarized in Appendix B.
A. Abilitazione Scientifica Nazionale
In Italy, four out of five committee members are selected through a random
draw from the pool of ‘Italian’ eligible evaluators and the remaining evaluator is
drawn out of the pool of ‘foreign’ eligible evaluators. The former pool consists
of full professors affiliated to Italian universities who volunteered to be members.
The latter pool consists of professors affiliated to universities from OECD coun-
tries, who also voluntarily participate in Italian evaluations. The randomization
procedure is subject to one important constraint: no university can have more
than one evaluator within a single committee.
The eligibility of evaluators is decided in the following way. In science, technol-
ogy, engineering, mathematics, medicine and psychology (STEMM), evaluators
are required to have a research output above the median for full professors in
the discipline in at least two of the following three dimensions: (i) the number of
articles published in scientific journals, (ii) the number of citations, (iii) and the H-
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index. In the social sciences and the humanities (SSH), the research performance
of evaluators has to be above the median in at least one of the following three
dimensions: (i) the number of articles published in high quality scientific jour-
nals (in what follows, A-journals),8 (ii) the overall number of articles published
in any scientific journals and book chapters, and (iii) the number of published
books. ‘Foreign’ eligible evaluators have to satisfy the same requirements. While
‘Italian’ evaluators work pro bono, ‘OECD’ evaluators receive e16,000 for their
participation.
Evaluations are based solely on the material provided in candidates’ applica-
tion packages consisting of CVs and recent publications. Committees have full
autonomy regarding the criteria to be used in the evaluation and the number of
qualifications to be granted. Each evaluation committee is required to draft and
publish online a document describing the general criteria to be used in provid-
ing a positive assessment. Candidates may withdraw their application up until
two weeks after evaluation criteria are publicized. A positive assessment of the
candidate requires a qualified majority of four out of five votes. Once granted,
qualifications are only valid for four years, while a negative evaluation means that
candidates are excluded from participating in further national evaluations during
the following two years.
An important feature of the Italian system is its extreme transparency: all the
relevant information – including candidates’ and evaluators’ CVs, as well as indi-
vidual evaluation reports – is published online. An independent evaluation agency
appointed by the ministry also collects and publicizes information on the research
output of final candidates in the ten years preceding the evaluation, as measured
by the three bibliometric indicators described above. The evaluation agency com-
pared the research productivity of candidates in each of these three dimensions
with the research productivity of professors in the category to which they applied,
and committees were asked to take this information into consideration.
B. Habilitacio´n
In Spain, committees are composed of seven members. In evaluations for full
professorships, all evaluators are full professors based in Spanish universities or
research institutes. In evaluations for associate professorships, three committee
members are full professors and four evaluators are associate professors. No more
than one non-university researcher is allowed to be selected as a member of the
committee for a given exam. Similarly, no more than one emeritus professor may
be selected as a member of a given committee.
In order to be eligible, evaluators are required to satisfy some minimum research
level which is assessed by the Spanish education authority.9 This requirement is
8An evaluation agency determined with the help of several scientific committees the set of journals
to be considered as high quality in each field.
9The Spanish education authority determines professors’ eligibility according to the number of sex-
enios completed. Sexenios are granted periodically by the ministry on the basis of applicants’ research
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satisfied by approximately 81 percent of full professors and 70 percent of associate
professors. Unlike the Italian system, where participation is voluntary, in Spain
all eligible professors can be selected to serve in committees.
Candidates for evaluation are required to make several oral presentations in
front of a committee. For candidates to full professorships, these exams have two
qualifying stages. In the first stage, each candidate presents the CV and then, in
the second stage, an example of his or her research work. Exams for the posi-
tion of associate professor, in addition to these two stages, have an intermediate
stage where candidates give a lecture on a topic randomly chosen from a syllabus
proposed by the candidate. In each stage evaluations are made on a majority
basis. Qualifications have unlimited validity once they have been granted. The
number of qualifications conceded at the national level is very limited and being
accredited is, in most cases, equivalent to being promoted.
II. Data
We use data on all evaluations from the first edition of the Italian Abilitazione
Scientifica Nazionale (years 2012-2014) and on all evaluations from the Spanish
Habilitacio´n (years 2002-2006). In Italy, the data includes information on 184
committees, one per each academic discipline. Each committee assessed both
applications to associate and to full professorships. In Spain, there are in total 967
committees in 174 disciplines, of which 502 are committees evaluating candidates
for full professorships and 465 evaluating candidates for associate professorships.
The dataset includes information on eligible and actually selected evaluators,
applicants, and the final outcome of the evaluation. In addition to demographic
characteristics and a number of productivity measures, we have also gathered
information on research networks and research specialization. In Appendix C we
provide detailed information on how this information was collected, and how each
variable was constructed. Below we briefly summarize the main features of the
dataset.
A. Evaluators
In Italy, 39 percent of Italian female full professors and 41 percent of Italian
male full professors volunteered and were considered eligible to sit in evaluation
committees. The list of eligible evaluators includes 5,876 professors based in
Italian universities and 1,365 evaluators based in OECD universities. In the
average field, the pool of eligible evaluators includes 32 ‘Italian’ professors and
eight ‘foreign’ professors. While approximately 20 percent of ‘Italian’ evaluators
are women, the ‘foreign’ pool is less feminized and only 12 percent of ‘foreign’
evaluators are women. Taking into account the composition of both pools, the
output in any uninterrupted period of a maximum of six years. Eligible associate professors are required
to have held at least one sexenio while eligible full professors are required to have held at least two
sexenios.
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expected share of women in the committee is around 18 percent, which is similar to
the initial share of women in actual committees.10 Approximately one out of every
thirteen evaluators resigned and was replaced by another eligible evaluator. These
replacements slightly increased the share of women in committees to 19 percent,
but the difference is not statistically significant. 41 percent of committees include
no women at all, in 35 percent there is one woman, in 16 percent there are two
women, and only 8 percent of committees have a majority of female evaluators.
Table C1 in Appendix C provides descriptive information on eligible evaluators
based in Italy.11 On average, they have been in a full professor position for
13 years. They list 131 publications in their CVs, of which just over half are
articles in scientific journals, and the rest are books, book chapters, publications
in conference proceedings, patents, etc. Around half of these publications were
published during the previous ten years. To assess the quality of research output,
in STEMM disciplines we compute their total Article Influence Score, summing
up the Article Influence Score of all publications; in SSH disciplines we use the
number of articles in A-journals.12 About 28 percent of eligible professors are
based in the South of Italy.
In columns 2-4, we compare characteristics of male and female evaluators. For
this comparison, we normalize all variables at the discipline level. Female evalua-
tors have significantly shorter tenure than their male counterparts and they also
have lower research output in almost all dimensions. They are less likely to be
based in the South, but this difference is not significant.
In Spain, the lists of eligible evaluators include 49,199 full professors and 61,052
associate professors.13 Women constitute 35 percent of eligible associate profes-
sors, but only 14 percent of full professors are women. Taking into account the
composition of both pools, the expected share of women in the committee is
around 19 percent. This figure is similar to the share of women in the initial
set of committees selected by random draw and is unaffected by the resignation
of 2 percent of evaluators. Overall, 32 percent of committees are composed by
only male evaluators, 29 percent of committees have one woman on board, 22
percent include two women, 11 percent three women, while only 6 percent have
more women than men.
We collect information on the research outcomes of Spanish researchers from
several sources. We observe their publications in international journals covered by
Web of Knowledge and their articles and books in the Spanish language included
10We have calculated the expected gender composition of committees using a simulation with 1,000,000
draws, taking into account that the lottery that decided committee composition was subject to the
constraint that committees cannot include more than one member from the same university.
11Unfortunately, we were unable to gather systematic information on ‘foreign’ evaluators. In their
case, the official CVs are not in a standardized format and they are often incomplete.
12Article Influence Score is available for all journals in the Thomson Reuters Web of Knowledge. It is
related to Impact Factor, but it takes into account the quality of the citing journals, the propensity to
cite across journals and it excludes self-citations.
13The Spanish data covers information from several evaluation waves, so many professors appear in
the lists several times. In total, there are 7,963 individual full professors and 21,979 individual associate
professors in these lists.
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in the database Dialnet, as well as patents in the European Patent Office in
which these researchers are listed as inventors. We also have information on
their activity as Ph.D. advisors and as members of dissertation committees. We
compare female and male eligible evaluators, normalizing their characteristics at
the level of exam and category. Results are very similar to the ones observed for
the Italian academia (see columns 6-8 and 10-12 of Table C1). Female eligible
evaluators are younger, have shorter tenure, and on average they published less
than male researchers in the same discipline and rank. They have also lower
accumulated quality-adjusted scientific production, they tend to participate less
in advising and evaluating doctoral students, and they are relatively less likely to
come from universities located in the southern regions of the country.14
B. Candidates
There were 69,020 applications in Italy. On average, there were 375 applications
per field, with 117 of them participating in evaluations for full professor positions
and 258 participating in evaluations for associate professor positions. Some can-
didates applied to more than one position: the average candidate participated in
1.5 evaluations.
As shown in the upper panel of Table C2, 31 percent of applications for the
position of full professor and 41 percent of applications for the position of as-
sociate professor were submitted by women. Candidates for a full professorship
are about 49 years old and candidates for an associate professorship are six years
younger. About half of the applicants for associate professorships hold a per-
manent contract and about three fourths of applicants for full professorships do.
Candidates mainly apply for an evaluation in the field in which they currently
hold a permanent contract.
Female applicants tend to be younger among applicants for associate professor-
ships, and they are of a similar age as their male counterparts in evaluations for
full professorships (columns 3-5 and 8-10). In both cases the publication record
of female candidates is significantly weaker. The only dimension in which women
seem to be achieving better results than men is in publishing conference proceed-
ings. In addition to information on productivity coming from candidates’ CVs,
we observe the order in which candidates submitted their applications. In prin-
ciple, the timing of the application might reflect both candidates’ self-confidence
and quality. We normalize this variable uniformly between 0 and 1. We observe
that female candidates for the post of full professor apply a bit later than their
male counterparts, but no similar gender difference can be observed among can-
didates for associate professor positions. In Italy, approximately 14 percent of
applications were withdrawn once the identity and the criteria of evaluators were
made public. Withdrawals were more common among female applicants. Overall,
14In Spain, we define A-journals following the journal rank developed by Dialnet, which categorizes
journals in four groups according to their prestige.
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approximately 38 percent of applications by male candidates and 35 percent of
applications by female candidates were successful.
As explained above, the evaluation agency of the Ministry of Education pub-
lished detailed information regarding the research production of the final set of
applicants in the 10 previous years. Around 38 percent of candidates were above
the median in each of the three corresponding bibliometric dimensions. Perfor-
mance according to these indicators is strongly correlated with success. Among
those candidates whose quality was below the median in every dimension there
was a success rate of only 4 percent, while among those who excelled in every
dimension there was a success rate of 63 percent.
In addition to the final decision of the committee, we also collected informa-
tion on the individual evaluation reports, available in the case of Italy. Overall we
observe around 300,000 individual reports. 45 percent of these reports were favor-
able to the candidate and most of the time decisions were taken unanimously (in
86 percent of the cases). Unanimity is relatively more frequent when applicants
are below the median in each of the three corresponding bibliometric dimensions
(93 percent) and when applicants are above the median in all three dimensions
(86 percent), and it is lower when applicants are above the median only in one
(84 percent) or two dimensions (82 percent).
In Spain, overall there were 13,444 applications for full professorships and 17,799
applications for associate professorships (lower panel of Table C2). The gender
ratios among applicants are very similar to the ones in Italy: around 27 percent of
applicants to full professor are women and there are around 40 percent of women
among applicants to associate professor. Once again, male applicants seem to
have stronger research records than their female counterparts. They also tend to
be slightly more successful in evaluations.
Finally, for the candidates who qualified in Spain, we collected information
on their individual research productivity in a five-year period following the na-
tional evaluations and on their performance in future evaluations for promotion
to full professor. This information allows us to assess the quality of selection not
only in terms of candidate characteristics easily observable at the moment of the
exam, but also in terms of dimensions that are difficult to observe but that are
nevertheless important determinants of future productivity.
C. Connections
We identify professional links between candidates and eligible evaluators. We
consider all the possible interactions within each discipline, around 2.5 million
possible pairs in Italy and 5.5 millions in Spain. As shown in Table C3, the
probability that a candidate and an eligible evaluator are affiliated to the same
institution is around 3 percent in Italy and 5 percent in Spain. The probability
that they have coauthored a paper is smaller: 1.4 percent in Italy and 0.4 percent
in Spain.
In the case of Spain, we also observe if there was a student-advisor relationship
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or if the candidate and the eligible evaluator have participated in the same thesis
committee.15 These links are relatively rare: in 0.2 percent of the cases the eligible
evaluator is the PhD thesis director of the candidate and in 1.3 percent they have
participated in the same thesis committee.
Male candidates tend to have more coauthors among eligible evaluators and
they are more likely to have interacted with an eligible evaluator previously in a
thesis committee (Table C3, columns 3-5).
D. Research similarity
We also collect information on the overlap of research interests between candi-
dates and eligible evaluators. Due to data availability, there are some differences
in how we define research similarity in the two countries. In the case of Italy,
we have information on the field and the subfield where researchers with a per-
manent contract in an Italian university are officially registered. There are 184
fields (settore concorsuale) and approximately 370 subfields (settore scientifico-
disciplinare).16 In about 60 percent of the cases the candidate and the eligible
evaluator belong to the same subfield (Table C3).
In the case of Spanish researchers, we infer their research interests using infor-
mation on their participation in doctoral dissertations, either as authors, advisors,
or committee members. In Spain, all doctoral theses are classified in more than
two thousand categories.17 Economics, for example, is divided into one hundred
different research fields (e.g.: Labor Economics). We construct a measure of the
overlap of the research interests of candidates and evaluators based on the sub-
field of every dissertation where they have been involved. In the spirit of Jaffe
(1986) and Bloom, Schankerman and Van Reenen (2013), we measure research
proximity between individuals i and j as the angular separation of the vectors
Si = (S1i...SCi) and Sj = (S1j ...SCj), where SCi is the share of dissertations in
category C in which individual i has been involved:
Overlapij =
SiS
′
j
(SiS′i)1/2(SjS
′
j)
1/2
.(1)
This index takes value one if two individuals have participated in dissertations in
the same subfields in the same proportion and value zero if there is no overlap. On
average, in our sample the degree of overlap between candidates and evaluators
15We consider three possible interactions: (i) the evaluator was a member of candidate’s thesis com-
mittee, (ii) one of them had invited the other to sit in her students’ thesis committee, or (ii) both of
them sat in the same student thesis committee.
16Historically, each Italian researcher was a assigned to certain settore scientifico-disciplinare. More
recently, upon the introduction of the new system of competitive exams, researchers were assigned also
to a settore concorsuale. The correspondence between the two classifications is not always unique, in
some cases researchers belonging to the same settore scientifico-disciplinare may be assigned to different
settore concorsuale.
17The author of the dissertation selects the subfield using the International Standard Nomenclature
for Fields of Science and Technology, a system developed by Unesco.
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is equal to 0.20. As shown in Table C3, female candidates are slightly more likely
than male candidates to share their research interests with eligible evaluators.
III. Empirical analysis
We start our analysis by providing descriptive information on the average suc-
cess rate of male and female applicants, unconditional and conditional on their
observable research productivity. Then we investigate how the gender composi-
tion of committees affects the success rate of male and female candidates, candi-
dates’ decision to withdraw their application and the quality of male and female
applicants who qualify. To achieve a better understanding of the observed pat-
terns, we use the information provided by individual voting reports to examine
how male and female evaluators vote within the same committee. We examine
whether male and female evaluators vote differently depending on the gender of
applicants, and we also investigate whether the presence of women in a committee
affects the voting behavior of male evaluators. Finally, we explore the relevance
of the main theories according to which evaluators’ gender may be relevant.
A. Gender gap
We estimate the gender gap separately for the applicants in the two countries
using the ordinary least squares (OLS) method:
Yie = β0 + β1Femalei + Xiβ2 + µe + ie(2)
where Yie is a dummy variable that takes value one if candidate i qualifies in
evaluation e and takes value zero if the candidate receives a negative evaluation
or withdraws the application before receiving the evaluation. Each evaluation e
refers to the examination that was conducted in a given field and position (e.g.
qualification for an associate professorship in Applied Economics in Spain in year
2005). Femalei is a dummy variable indicating the gender of the candidate and
Xi includes all (normalized) productivity indicators and individual characteristics
listed in Table C2. We allow the effect of productivity indicators to vary across
disciplinary groups, and the effect of age and contract type to vary across disci-
plinary groups and levels of promotion. Evaluation fixed effects (µe) control for
any differences across evaluations that might affect the success rate of male and
female candidates in a similar way. Throughout the analysis, we cluster standard
errors at the committee level.
In Italy, the success rate of female candidates is 2.8 p.p. lower than male
candidates in the same exam, unconditional on any measure of quality (Table 1,
column 1, upper panel). In Spain, the unconditional gender gap is equal to 2.2
p.p. (column 1, lower panel). In both countries, approximately half of the gender
gap can be explained by the differences in observable characteristics (column 2).
The remaining conditional gender gap is equal to 1.5 p.p. in Italy (4 percent
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relative to the success rate of men) and 1.4 p.p. in Spain (12 percent) and it is
statistically significant in both countries.
It is unclear whether the remaining gap should be attributed to evaluators bi-
ases or to differences in unobservable characteristics. There may be substantial
differences in the quality of male and female candidates which are not fully cap-
tured by our controls. Furthermore, the individual proxies of quality that we use
in our analysis, such as position, affiliation or publications might also be the out-
come of discriminatory processes, which would further hinder the interpretation
of β1.
B. The impact of committees’ gender composition on the chances of success of male
and female candidates
We examine whether the gender composition of committees affects the success
rate of male and female applicants. In order to obtain causal estimates, our
analysis exploits the random assignment of evaluators to committees. We compare
the performance of applicants who initially were expected to face an evaluation
committee with the same gender composition but, due to the random draw, were
assigned to committees with a different number of female evaluators. Given that a
few of the evaluators who were initially selected eventually declined to participate
and were substituted by other (randomly selected) evaluators, first we report
results from an intention-to-treat analysis where our independent variable is the
gender composition of the initial set of evaluators. Later on, we instrument the
gender composition of the committee which actually evaluated applicants using
the gender composition of the committee initially drawn.
Intention-to-treat analysis
We estimate the following equation on the pool of applicants using OLS:18
Yie = β0 + β1Femalei + β2Female
initial
e + β3Femalei ∗ Femaleinitiale +
+ β4Female
expected
e + β5Femalei ∗ Femaleexpectede + Xiβ6 + ie(3)
where Femaleinitiale represents the share of female evaluators in the committee
that was initially randomly drawn, before any evaluator resigned, and Femaleexpectede
is the expected share of women in this committee, calculated based on the com-
position of the pool of eligible evaluators and the rules that determine the draw.19
In order to increase the accuracy of the estimation, we also include applicants’
predetermined characteristics (Xi) and, in some specifications, evaluation fixed
effects (µe).
18Results from probit estimations are very similar and are available upon request. We report the
results for the linear probability model because interpreting the interaction effects is simpler.
19To ease the interpretation of coefficient β1, we center Female
expected
e at zero by subtracting its
sample mean.
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Table 1—The causal impact of committees’ gender composition
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Dependent variable: Qualified Applied
OLS OLS ITT IV IV IV IV
Italy
Female candidate -0.028 -0.015 -0.004 0.001 0.008 0.009 -0.026
(0.006) (0.005) (0.009) (0.011) (0.008) (0.007) (0.006)
Share of women in committee 0.000 -0.0004 - - -
(0.059) (0.071)
Female candidate* Share of women
in committee
-0.092 -0.116 -0.128 -0.132 -0.025
(0.036) (0.050) (0.035) (0.036) (0.026)
Adj. R-squared 0.001 0.240 0.245 0.245 0.236 0.236 0.075
Number of observations 69020 69020 69020 69020 69020 69020 69020
Mean dep. var. (for men) 0.38 0.38 0.38 0.38 0.38 0.38 0.87
Spain
Female candidate -0.022 -0.014 -0.009 -0.009 -0.011 -0.010
(0.004) (0.004) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Share of women in committee 0.011 0.012 - -
(0.017) (0.018)
Female candidate* Share of women
in committee
-0.018 -0.019 -0.016 -0.022
(0.026) (0.027) (0.028) (0.028)
Adj. R-squared 0.001 0.036 0.039 0.039 0.005 0.005
Number of observations 31243 31243 31243 31243 31243 31243
Mean dep. var. (for men) 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12
Controls for both panels:
Candidate characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Exam FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Expected share of women Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Female candidate* Expected
share of women
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Committee characteristics Yes
Note: Candidate characteristics include all individual predetermined characteristics listed in Table C2 in
the Online Appendix. Committee characteristics include the interaction between candidates’ gender and
the average tenure of evaluators (Italy only), their age (Spain only), their quality-adjusted productivity
during the previous 10 years, and the proportion of committee members based in the South. The first-
stage results for the IV estimations reported in columns 4 and 5 are available in Table D1. Standard
errors are clustered by committee.
Coefficient β2 captures the causal effect of committees’ initial gender compo-
sition upon the success rate of male candidates, and coefficient β3 shows how
the gender gap varies depending on the share of women in the committee. Since
Femaleinitiale is computed using the initial assignment of evaluators, coefficients
β2 and β3 provide intention-to-treat estimates. The causal interpretation of β2
and β3 relies on the assumption that the assignment was indeed random. The way
in which the randomization was conducted in each country suggests that there was
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little room for manipulation.20 Nonetheless, before moving into the discussion of
the impact of committees’ gender composition on candidates’ chances of success,
we verify empirically that, conditional on the expected composition of the com-
mittee, its actual composition is uncorrelated with any observable predetermined
factor. We estimate equation (3) using predetermined characteristics included in
Xi as outcome variables instead of controls. As expected, the evidence is consis-
tent with the assignment being indeed random. Table 2 shows estimation results
for the eleven predetermined variables that are common for Italian and Spanish
databases. Out of forty four coefficients, only two are significantly different from
zero at 5 percent level. A joint F-test cannot reject that quality of female and
male candidates is similar across committees with different gender compositions.
20In Italy, a random sequence of numbers was drawn and was then applied to several disciplines. In
Spain, the random draw was carried out publicly on the same day for all disciplines and was certified by
the notary.
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We examine the causal impact of committees’ gender composition in column 3
of Table 1. In Italy, the proportion of women in committees has no significant
impact on the success rate of male candidates and it has a significant negative
impact on the relative chances of success of female candidates (upper panel). An
additional female evaluator decreases the relative chances of success of female
candidates by approximately 1.8 p.p. (β2 = −0.092, ∆Femalee=1/5). In Spain,
the share of female evaluators has a positive effect on the success rate of male
candidates and a negative effect on the success rate of female candidates, though
these effects are not significantly different from zero (lower panel).
To make estimates from Spain and Italy more comparable, it is useful to con-
sider explicitly the upper and the lower bounds of a 95 percent confidence interval.
In Italy, an additional woman in the committee decreases the success rate of fe-
male candidates relative to men by somewhere between 0.4 and 3.3 p.p. In Spain,
an extra woman on the committee can lower it by at maximum 1.0 p.p. but
she can also increase it by up to 0.5 p.p. In sum, the impact that women in
committees have upon the relative success rate of female candidates is negative
and statistically significant only in the Italian case, but we cannot reject that the
effect is statistically similar in the two countries.
Instrumental variables estimates
To account for the resignation of some evaluators before the actual evaluation
took place, we instrument the final gender composition of the committee using as
an instrument the initial composition determined by the random draw. Specif-
ically, we estimate the following equation using the instrumental variables (IV)
method:
Yie = β0 + β1Femalei + β2Female
final
e + β3Femalei ∗ Femalefinale +
+ β4Female
expected
e + β5Femalei ∗ Femaleexpectede + Xiβ6 + ie(4)
where Femalefinale represents the share of female evaluators in the committee
that evaluated candidates, and Femalefinale and Femalei ∗ Femalefinale are in-
strumented using Femaleinitiale and Femalei ∗ Femaleinitiale .
The first stage results of the IV estimation show that there is a strong rela-
tionship between the initial and the final gender composition of committees (see
Table D1). The IV estimates are slightly larger but very similar to the intention-
to-treat estimates (column 4 of Table 1). To further increase the precision of these
estimates, we also reestimate equation (4) including evaluation fixed effects. The
estimates are slightly more accurate but they are (statistically) unchanged (col-
umn 5 of Table 1).
Female and male evaluators differ in a number of dimensions. As shown in
Table C1, male evaluators tend to be relatively older, have longer tenure, and a
longer publication record. They are also more likely to be based in the south of
Italy and Spain. In order to check whether our results can be explained by these
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differences, we estimate equation (4) including the interaction between evaluators’
characteristics and candidates’ gender. The inclusion of these controls does not
affect our previous estimates (Table 1, column 6).
The range of variation in gender composition that we exploit in our analysis
is typically between committees with no women and committees with a minority
of women. In Appendix E we also show that within this range there are no
significant nonlinearities.
C. Does the presence of women in the committee affect candidates’ decision to
withdraw?
So far we have considered the initial sample of candidates. Some of these
candidates dropped from the evaluation process after committees were formed,
perhaps because they anticipated that they had only a small chance to qualify
and they preferred to avoid the costs associated to failure. These candidates did
not receive an evaluation from the committee.
Therefore, the above estimates may in principle capture the effect that the
gender composition of a committee has upon candidates’ decision to self-select
into the process. To examine this issue, we use data from Italy and estimate
equation (4) using as the dependent variable the indicator for those candidates
who did not withdraw their application. While relatively fewer women decided
to go ahead with the application (-2.6 p.p.), these differences are not related to
the share of female evaluators (Table 1, column 7). The evidence thus suggests
that committees’ gender composition does not affect application decisions and its
impact on the chances of success of candidates can be attributed to evaluations.
D. Does the presence of women in the committee affect the quality of promoted
candidates?
An additional justification for increasing female representation in committees
might be that female researchers help to reduce evaluation biases and select bet-
ter candidates, even though not necessarily more female candidates. To learn
about the quality of the assessments, we compare the observable productivity of
candidates who qualified in committees with different gender compositions:
qie = β0 + β1Female
final
e + β2Female
expected
e + ie(5)
where qie is a proxy of candidate i’s quality, measured at the time of the evalua-
tion or during the following five years. We estimate equation (5) for all qualified
candidates, and then separately for females and males. We instrument the fi-
nal gender composition of the committee (Femalefinal) using the original one
(Femaleinitial).
We consider several proxies of quality. First, we consider the research output
of successful candidates at the time of the evaluation. As shown in Table 3,
candidates that were promoted by committees with a different gender composition
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are at the time of the evaluation statistically similar in terms of the number
of papers that they have published, the quality of the journals, the number of
students advised or their participation in theses committees.
Table 3—Quality of qualified candidates
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Dep. var.: Publications Citations Total AIS A-journal PhD students PhD thesis Success in future
articles advised committees evaluations
A. Italy, before the evaluation
All 0.017 0.130 -0.055 -0.135
(0.088) (0.117) (0.157) (0.255)
Women -0.044 0.139 0.154 -0.102
(0.112) (0.143) (0.170) (0.317)
Men 0.029 0.098 -0.208 -0.213
(0.101) (0.150) (0.211) (0.251)
B. Spain, before the evaluation
All 0.022 0.072 -0.088 -0.200 0.125 -0.147
(0.145) (0.223) (0.244) (0.237) (0.136) (0.132)
Women 0.210 0.469 -0.004 -0.142 0.580 0.053
(0.206) (0.370) (0.399) (0.329) (0.229) (0.220)
Men -0.124 -0.242 -0.215 -0.219 -0.170 -0.303
(0.193) (0.291) (0.301) (0.333) (0.176) (0.168)
C. Spain, after the evaluation
All 0.016 -0.060 -0.098 -0.173 0.175 -0.086 0.042
(0.132) (0.218) (0.227) (0.181) (0.135) (0.136) (0.052)
Women 0.345 -0.009 -0.102 0.170 0.119 -0.117 0.001
(0.213) (0.356) (0.376) (0.288) (0.212) (0.231) (0.054)
Men -0.187 -0.140 -0.247 -0.266 0.080 -0.134 0.019
(0.182) (0.281) (0.284) (0.252) (0.191) (0.186) (0.077)
Note: OLS estimates for the sample of qualified candidates. Each coefficient corresponds to an indepen-
dent regression for a given sample and dependent variable. In panels A and B the dependent variables
are measured at the time of the evaluation. In panel C the dependent variables refer to the output in
the five-year period following the evaluation. Success in future evaluations takes value one if a candidate
who obtained a qualification for an associate professorship in our sample, qualifies in the evaluation for
full professorship by year 2013. The dependent variables in columns 1-6 are normalized to have zero
mean and unit variance for candidates within each exam. Citations and Article Influence Score are only
available for candidates in science, technology, engineering, mathematics, medicine and psychology. In-
formation on publications in A-journals is only provided for candidates in social sciences and humanities.
All regressions include nonparametric controls for expected share of women in the committee, disciplinary
area*rank, and age. Standard errors are clustered by committee.
Using the Spanish data, we also examine the research productivity of successful
candidates during the five-year period following the evaluation. Additionally, for
the candidates who qualified to positions of associate professor, we check whether
they succeeded in obtaining a qualification for full professorship. Once again,
we see no evidence that the quality of candidates who qualify is related to the
number of women who sat on these candidates’ evaluation committees. Overall,
we do not observe any indication that committees with more female evaluators
select better or worse candidates.
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E. Individual voting
We have documented that mixed-gender committees are not more favorable
towards female candidates than all-male committees. This finding is consistent
with several possibilities. It might be that female evaluators are not more fa-
vorable towards female candidates than their male counterparts. Alternatively,
maybe female evaluators are more sympathetic towards female candidates (or less
unbiased) but their presence in the committee induces male evaluators to become
less favorable towards female candidates. To shed light on this issue, we analyze
the information provided by individual voting reports, available in Italy.
First, we compare the assessments of male and female evaluators sitting in the
same committee. We estimate the following equation:
Vije = β0 + β1Femalej + β2Femalei ∗ Femalej + µie + ije,(6)
where Vije takes value one if evaluator j casted a positive vote for candidate i in
evaluation e, and Femalei and Femalej are indicators that capture the gender of
the candidate and the evaluator respectively. A vector of application fixed effects
µie captures any differences in application characteristics that are observable to
all evaluators.
The empirical results suggest that, if anything, female evaluators are more
favorable towards female candidates than male evaluators. Female candidates
are 0.7 p.p. (1.6 percent) more likely to receive a positive vote from a female
evaluator than from a male evaluator, although this difference is not statistically
different from zero (Table 4, column 1). This estimate is likely to be a lower
bound of the overall effect. Committee members share information and discuss
their decision before casting their vote. A high fraction of committees reach
unanimous decisions, suggesting that there may be less disagreement reflected in
these final individual evaluations than there would have been at interim stages.
Another question that we would like to answer is whether the voting behavior
of male evaluators changes when there are women on the committee. We estimate
the following equation on the sample of assessments granted by male evaluators:
Vije = β0 + β1Femalei + β2Female
final
je + β3Femalei ∗ Femalefinalje +
+ β4Female
expected
je + β5Femalei ∗ Femaleexpectedje + Xiβ4 + ij ,(7)
where Femalefinalje and Female
expected
je stand respectively for the actual and the
expected share of women in a committee including evaluator j.21 Coefficient β2
captures how the probability that a male candidate receives a positive vote from
a male evaluator varies depending on the gender composition of the committee.
Similarly, coefficient β3 captures how the presence of women in the committee
21We compute these expectations separately for each evaluator using the outcomes of 1,000,000 sim-
ulated random draws that take into account the rules of the randomization.
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Table 4—Individual voting
1 2 3 4
All evaluators Male evaluators
Female candidate - -0.0004 0.008 -0.003
(0.009) (0.006) (0.006)
Female evaluator -0.001
(0.007)
Female candidate * Female evaluator 0.007
(0.005)
Share of women in committee 0.017 - -
(0.079)
Female candidate*Share of women in committee -0.042 -0.061 -0.078
(0.043) (0.030) (0.030)
Controls:
Application FE Yes
Expected share of women Yes Yes Yes
Female candidate*Expected share of women Yes Yes Yes
Candidate characteristics Yes Yes Yes
Exam FE Yes Yes
Number of observations 294,656 240988 240988 281289
Note: OLS estimates. The dependent variable is an indicator that takes value one if the evaluator casted
a positive vote for a given candidate. Column 1 includes information from all individual evaluations,
columns 2-4 include information only on evaluations by male evaluators. In column 4 we also include
applications that were withdrawn after committee composition was announced, imputing a negative
assessment to these applications. Candidate characteristics include all predetermined characteristics
listed in Table C2. Standard errors are clustered by committee.
affects the probability that a female candidate receives a positive vote from a
male evaluator, relative to a male candidate.
There are three possible threats to the consistency of our estimates. First,
similarly to the analysis conducted in previous sections, the initial assignment of
evaluators to committees should be random. As shown above, this assumption
is satisfied. Second, we do not observe the assessments that would have been
casted by evaluators who resigned (8 percent of initial evaluators). This might
introduce a selection bias if resignations are related to the gender composition
of the committee or to evaluators’ gender biases. We examine this possibility in
Appendix F. We do not find evidence suggesting that resignations are related to
gender issues. Third, given that we only observe the evaluations received by can-
didates who did not withdraw their application (86 percent of applicants), a bias
might arise if candidates’ withdrawal decision somehow depends on committees’
gender composition or gender biases. Our previous analysis shows that the gen-
der composition of committees does not affect application decisions (see section
4.3). As a robustness check, we also consider an additional specification where
we impute a negative assessment to every withdrawn application.
According to our estimates, each additional female evaluator in the committee
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increases the probability that a male candidate receives a positive vote from a
male evaluator by 0.3 p.p. (β2 = 0.017, ∆Female
final
e = 1/5) and it decreases
the probability that a female candidate receives a positive vote, relative to a male
candidate, by 0.8 p.p. (β3 = −0.042, ∆Femalefinale = 1/5), although these esti-
mates are not significantly different from zero (Table 4, column 2). To increase
the accuracy of the estimation, we also include evaluation fixed effects. According
to this specification, each additional woman in the committee reduces the prob-
ability that a female candidate receives a positive vote from a male evaluator by
1.2 p.p. (β3 = −0.061, ∆Femalefinale = 1/5), relative to the probability that a
male candidate receives a positive vote (column 3). This effect is significant at
the 5 percent level. The estimate is slightly larger, around 1.6 p.p., if we consider
in our analysis also candidates who withdrew their application (column 4).
F. Mechanisms
The two large-scale randomized natural experiments provide a clear result: in-
creasing the proportion of women in scientific committees does not increase the
success rate of female candidates. The analysis of individual votes within the
committee suggests that this is due to two factors. On the one hand, female
evaluators are slightly more likely to vote in favor of female candidates than male
evaluators, but this effect is not economically or statistically significant. On the
other hand, the presence of women in the committee decreases the probability
that female candidates receive a positive vote from male evaluators. Next, we
analyze these two issues in more detail.
Why are women not more supportive of other women?
The literature has emphasized several theoretical arguments according to which
evaluators are expected to favor same-sex candidates. The most prominent ones
are the existence of gender segregation across research networks, gender segrega-
tion across subfields of research, gender stereotypes and discrimination against
women attaining top positions. Next, we provide an in-depth examination of
these theories and we try to understand why they do not play a more important
role in our data.
Gender segregation across research networks
One of the arguments behind gender quotas is the existence of ‘old boy net-
works’. If professional connections with committee members help to achieve suc-
cess and, at the same time, these connections are gendered, female candidates
might be at a disadvantage when evaluation committees do not include women.
The relevance of ‘old boy networks’ depends on three factors: (i) the extent to
which networks are gendered, (ii) the likelihood that applicants are evaluated by
a member of their network, and (iii) the magnitude of the connection premium.
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First, we examine whether research networks in Spain and Italy are gendered.
We consider all possible pairs between candidates and potential evaluators within
a given field and we analyze whether the probability of being linked varies with
their gender:
Lij = β0 + β1Femalei + β2Femalej + β3Femalei ∗ Femalej + µe + ij(8)
where Lij stands for any of the observable links between candidate i and eligible
evaluator j. Femalei and Femalej are indicators for female candidates and
eligible evaluators, and µe are evaluation fixed effects.
As expected, links tend to be gendered. The β3 estimate is positive and signif-
icant in all specifications, indicating that, when a male eligible evaluator is sub-
stituted by a woman, female candidates’ likelihood of being connected increases
relatively more than male candidates’ in every dimension (Table 5).
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In Italy, the likelihood of observing a female professor with the same affiliation
as a female candidate is 0.6 p.p. (20 percent) larger than the likelihood of observ-
ing a similar link between a female professor and a male candidate.22 In Spain,
female professors are 0.4 p.p. (8 percent) more likely to be in the same institution
as a female candidate, relative to the probability of being affiliated to the same
institution as a male candidate. Coauthorships are also relatively more likely
when individuals share the same sex. In Italy female professors are 0.3 p.p. (23
percent) more likely to coauthor with a female candidate than with a male one;
in Spain the premium is equal to 0.1 p.p. (23 percent). Similarly, PhD supervi-
sions and participation in PhD committees are also gendered. Female professors
are 0.04 p.p. (33 percent) more likely to have a female advisee and 0.03 p.p. (3
percent) more likely to have participated in the same dissertation committee as
a female candidate.
Another relevant factor is whether candidates benefit from the presence of a
member of their network in an evaluation committee. Previous work by Zinovyeva
and Bagues (2015) and Bagues, Sylos-Labini and Zinovyeva (2015) documents the
existence of a substantial connection premium in qualification exams in Spain and
Italy. However, while connections in evaluation committees might be useful, they
are relatively rare in a context where evaluations are conducted at the national
level. For instance, as pointed out in section II.C, the probability that a candidate
and an eligible evaluator are colleagues is around 3 percent in Italy and 5 percent
in Spain. The probability that they are coauthors is even lower, around 1.4
percent in Italy and 0.4 percent in Spain. In sum, we observe a relative large
degree of gender segregation across networks and also a substantial connection
premium, but the impact of these two factors is likely to be attenuated by the
scarcity of connections in committees.23
Next, we study whether taking into account connections between candidates
and evaluators affects our estimates of the impact of committees’ gender compo-
sition. We estimate the following equation:
Yie = β0 + β1Femalei + β2Femalei ∗ Femalefinale + Liefinalβ3+
+ β4Femalei ∗ Femaleexpectede + Lexpectedie β5 + Xiβ6 + µe + ie(9)
where Lie
final is a vector including the different types of links between committee
members and candidates. We also include as controls the expected proportion
of links in the committee Lexpectedie and we instrument the final composition of
the committee (Femalefinale , Lie
final) using the outcome of the initial lottery
22We have calculated this figure using the information reported in Table 5, column 1. The probability
that a female professor and a female candidate in the Italian sample are affiliated to the same university
is equal to 3.34 percent (0.0026+0.0017+0.0029+0.0262), and the probability that a female professor and
a male candidate are colleagues is equal to 2.79 percent (0.0017+0.0262).
23There are may be also weaker links between candidates and evaluators, such as the existence of a
common a coauthor. Zinovyeva and Bagues (2015) show that these indirect links tend also to be gendered
but they do not have a significant impact on evaluation outcomes.
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draw (Femaleinitiale , Lie
initial). The vector of coefficients β3 provides information
about the causal impact of connections in the committee.
Table 6 reports the results of this analysis. In line with the findings of Zinovyeva
and Bagues (2015) and Bagues, Sylos-Labini and Zinovyeva (2015), we find that
connections with evaluators are helpful for promotion. The presence of a colleague
in the committee increases the success rate of connected candidates by 3.6 p.p.
(10 percent) in Italy and by 4.6 p.p. (41 percent) in Spain.24 The impact of
coauthors is larger: 4.7 p.p. (13 percent) in Italy and 12.8 p.p. (112 percent)
in Spain. Candidates with an advisor in the evaluation committee also enjoy a
premium of 9.0 p.p. (79 percent) and when an evaluator has interacted previously
with the candidate in some thesis committee the premium is around 2.5 p.p. (22
percent). However, the inclusion of connections as controls in the analysis does not
affect significantly our estimates of the effect of evaluators’ gender on candidates’
success rate (columns 1 and 5 vs. columns 2 and 6). As pointed out above, a
plausible explanation for why connections, while being gendered, do not affect
significantly our estimates may be related to their scarcity. For instance, in Italy
the probability that a female candidate and a male evaluator are coauthors is
around 1.4 percent. This probability increases by 0.1 p.p. when the evaluator
is also female. Taking into account the premium associated to the presence of
a coauthor in the committee (4.7 p.p.), replacing a male evaluator by a female
one translates into an increase in the average success rate of female candidates
by a mere 0.005 p.p. Moreover, as we show in Appendix G, evaluators’ support
of connected candidates does not depend on their gender.
24To calculate these figures we take into account the number of committee members in Italy and Spain
(5 and 7 respectively) and the average success rate in each country (37 percent and 11 percent). For
instance, in Italy the presence of a colleague in the committee has an impact of 3.6 p.p. (β3 = 0.181,
∆Femalefinale = 1/5). Relative to an average success rate of 37 percent, this implies a 10 percent
premium.
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Gender segregation across research subfields
Another argument in favor of increasing the share of women in committees has
been the potential existence of gender segregation across subfields. If committee
members tend to prefer candidates with similar research interests and, at the
same time, men and women are segregated across research subfields, the lack of
women in committees might hinder the ability of female candidates to succeed.
The extent of gender segregation across subfields is likely to depend on the level
of aggregation at which evaluations are held. Segregation is probably larger when
applicants are grouped in a few broadly defined fields. In the nation-wide evalu-
ations that we analyze in this paper, applicants were classified in approximately
200 different fields (e.g. Applied Economics). We check whether, at this level
of aggregation, candidates are more likely to have the same research interests as
eligible evaluators of the same gender. We estimate equation (8) using as the
dependent variable the research similarity between candidates and eligible evalu-
ators. We observe gender segregation across research subfields in both countries
but its magnitude is relatively small. In Italy, a female eligible evaluator is 1.3
p.p. relatively more likely to be in the same subfield as a female candidate than in
the subfield of a male candidate. In Spain, the overlap between a female eligible
evaluator and a female candidate is 0.4 p.p. larger (Table 5, columns 3 and 8).
Research similarity with evaluators tends to increase candidates’ chances of suc-
cess, but the effect of female evaluators on female candidates’ relative success rate
is unchanged when we control in the estimation for research similarity (Table 6,
columns 3-4 and 7-8). This is consistent with the relatively small level of gender
segregation observed. In sum, gender segregation across research interests is too
limited for female candidates to benefit significantly from more female evaluators
in the committee.
Stereotypes
An additional theoretical argument in favor of a higher female presence in eval-
uation committees is that senior male researchers might have stereotypes against
female candidates. If senior female researchers do not share these stereotypes,
having more women on the committee might reduce the impact of gender preju-
dices.
Stereotyping might be stronger when evaluators are less informed about candi-
dates’ quality. Given that it might be particularly difficult to assess the quality
of candidates who do research in subfields that lie far away from evaluators’
knowledge, we divide evaluations in two groups based on the distance between
evaluators’ and candidates’ research interests. The evidence suggests that infor-
mation asymmetries matter, but the presence of women in the committee does
not contribute to eliminate potential gender biases. When candidates and evalu-
ators work in similar areas, evaluators’ gender does not have a significant impact
(Table 7, first row). However, when candidates do research in a different subfield,
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female candidates tend to perform significantly worse when there are relatively
more women in the committee. This pattern is observed in both countries.
Table 7—Heterogeneity analysis
1 2 3 4
Italy Spain
Research overlap ≥ median < median ≥ median < median
0.011 -0.179 0.081 -0.125
(0.046) (0.066) (0.047) (0.044)
Discipline SSH STEMM SSH STEMM
-0.119 -0.133 -0.027 0.003
(0.058) (0.037) (0.039) (0.041)
Feminization of field ≥ median < median ≥ median < median
-0.149 -0.072 -0.018 -0.016
(0.042) (0.057) (0.040) (0.037)
Level of promotion FP AP FP AP
-0.111 -0.138 0.120 -0.072
(0.059) (0.038) (0.054) (0.032)
Note: IV estimates. The dependent variable is a dummy variable that takes value one if the candidate
qualified. Each coefficient corresponds to an independent regression for the corresponding sample. Re-
search overlap is a proportion of committee members with similar research interest as defined in section
II.D. SSH stands for social sciences and humanities, and STEMM for science, technology, engineering,
mathematics, medicine, and psychology. Feminization of the field is measured by the proportion of
women among full professors in the discipline. FP and AP stand, respectively, for full and associate
professors. Standard errors are clustered by committee.
It is also sometimes argued that stereotyping against women is stronger in sci-
ences and mathematics-related disciplines (Reuben, Sapienza and Zingales, 2014).
We compare the effect of female evaluators in STEMM and SSH disciplines, but
we do not observe any significant differences between these two groups neither in
Spain nor in Italy (Table 7, second row).
One might also expect prejudices against women to be stronger in disciplines
that are less feminized and, therefore, offer fewer chances to interact with fe-
male researchers. We examine separately disciplines with a relatively low and a
relatively high proportion of women among full professors. We do not find any
evidence suggesting that evaluators in these two groups differ in terms of their
preference for candidates of the same sex (Table 7, third row).25
High-level positions
The impact of committees’ gender composition might also depend on the im-
portance of the position at stake. Some male evaluators might be reluctant to
25In Table H1 in Appendix H we report results from an alternative specification of heterogeneity tests.
Instead of splitting the sample in two groups based on the overlap of candidates’ and evaluators’ research
interests and on the degree of feminization of the discipline, we estimate a model with triple interactions
exploiting the full range of possible values of these variables. Results from these alternative specifications
are in line with the findings discussed in this section.
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see a female colleague at the top of the academic career ladder. They might hold
negative stereotypes of women, for instance, regarding their leadership or other
abilities specific to full professor positions. There might also be a problem of
taste-discrimination.
We examine separately the effect of female presence upon the evaluation com-
mittee for candidates to full and associate professor positions (Table 7, fourth
row). We do not observe any significant differences between these groups of eval-
uations in Italy, but we do observe a significant difference between exams for
full and associate professorships in Spain. Specifically, it appears that in Spain,
in committees assessing candidates to full professor positions, a higher female
presence has a positive impact on female candidates’ relative chances of success.
However, the opposite is true in evaluations for promotion to more junior posi-
tions.
So, in the case of promotions to full professorships in Spain, but not in Italy,
the result is consistent with the existence of stereotypes, or even of taste discrim-
ination, against women by committees with low or no representation of women.
Analysis by disciplinary groups
Beyond these theories, it might be that the gender composition of committees
matters in some specific fields. The previous empirical literature of evaluators’
gender does not provide a clear pattern. Two articles that study the role evalua-
tors’ gender in Science and Economics find that evaluators tend to prefer candi-
dates of the same sex (Casadevall and Handelsman, 2014, De Paola and Scoppa,
2015), but in two other studies conducted in the same disciplines evaluators ex-
hibit a preference for candidates of the other sex (Broder, 1993, Ellemers et al.,
2004). Six other articles in different fields do not find any significant relation-
ship.26
Following the official classification of disciplines adopted by the Italian Min-
istry, we consider 16 different groups of disciplines: Industrial Engineering, Civil
Engineering, Physics, Mathematics, Chemistry, Geology, Biology, Veterinary,
Medicine, Psychology, Architecture, Economics and Business, Social Sciences,
History, Languages and Law. We estimate equation (4) separately for each group
and each country, including evaluation fixed effects and instrumenting the final
composition of the committee with the initial one. We report these estimates
in Figure 1. Out of 32 coefficients, 28 are not significant, one is significantly
positive and three are significantly negative. When we take into account in the
calculation of standard errors that we are running multiple regressions using a
Bonferroni correction none of the coefficients remains significant. Altogether, it
is not possible to reject that the impact is similar to zero in any of the differ-
ent samples. Similarly, we cannot reject the hypothesis that the effect is similar
across different fields.
26See more details in Table A1.
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Why does the presence of women in the committee affect the voting
behavior of male evaluators?
There are at least three potential explanations. The presence of women in
the committee might unleash a backlash against female candidates, particularly
in fields that have been historically dominated by men (Crocker and McGraw,
1984). While we cannot directly test this hypothesis, we do not observe any
significant difference in the impact of committees’ gender composition depending
on the degree of feminization of the field (see Table 7, third row).
The presence of female evaluators might also induce a licensing effect (Monin
and Miller, 2001). In all-male committees, evaluators may feel that they have a
moral obligation to worry about sexism and seek to overcome it by expressing
more positive (and perhaps less discriminatory) views about female candidates.
When there are women on a committee, men may feel licensed to express more
honest opinions about female candidates. Furthermore, female evaluators might
strengthen male identities within committees and hence weaken their support
for female candidates (Akerlof and Kranton, 2000). Unfortunately, we cannot
disentangle empirically these two competing hypotheses, licensing effect and male
identity priming.
IV. Conclusions
A larger presence of women in scientific committees is frequently defended in
policy discussions. This paper contributes to this debate by providing a com-
prehensive and systematic analysis of the impact of scientific committees’ gender
composition. We exploit the exceptional evidence provided by qualification eval-
uations for full and associate professorships in every discipline in two different
countries, Italy and Spain. These evaluations involved around 100,000 applica-
tions and 8,000 evaluators in all academic fields. The random assignment of
evaluators to committees creates a setting of large-scale natural randomized ex-
periments. We also take advantage of the availability of very detailed information
about candidates, evaluators and the content of evaluations, in order to analyze
explicitly the theoretical arguments that are usually employed in support of a
higher representation of women in scientific committees.
In general, the presence of female evaluators in the committee neither increases
the success rate of female candidates, nor does it alter the quality of selected
candidates. Strikingly, in all but one subsamples we observe the opposite pattern
in success rates: committees with a higher women share tend to be relatively less
favorable towards female candidates. The only exception refers to evaluations
to full professorships in Spain, where female candidates have better chances of
success when evaluated by a committee with more women.
Information from individual votes within committees suggests that there are
two factors that explain why a larger presence of women does not increase the
success rate of female candidates. First, while female committee members are
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slightly more favorable towards female candidates than their male colleagues,
this effect is not economically or statistically significant. Second, male evaluators
become less favorable towards female candidates when women are present in the
committee, perhaps due to a licensing effect or to male identity priming.
Two common arguments that are usually employed in support of a higher repre-
sentation of women in scientific committees - gendered networks and segregation
across subfields - do not play an important role in our data. We document the
existence of gender segregation across research networks in both countries. A fe-
male candidate is significantly more likely to be connected to a female evaluator,
as measured by coauthorships, affiliation, doctoral thesis supervision and par-
ticipation in theses committees. We also observe that committees tend to favor
connected candidates. However, in the nation-wide evaluations that we consider
in this paper the likelihood of connections between candidates and evaluators
is small and, therefore, the impact of gendered networks on evaluations is very
modest. We also find that evaluators have a preference for candidates with sim-
ilar research interests but the extent of gender segregation within each field is
relatively small. As a result, the impact of gender segregation on evaluation out-
comes is very limited. Another justification for increasing the presence of women
in committees is that male evaluators may hold stereotypes that have a negative
effect upon female candidates. In order to explore the potential impact of gen-
der stereotypes, we focus on cases where information asymmetries are expected
to be important. Our results indicate that the gender of evaluators only mat-
ters when evaluators are not familiar with candidates’ research. However, in this
case gender-mixed committees are less favorable towards women than all-male
committees.
It remains an open question how the specific institutional characteristics of the
Italian and the Spanish promotion systems affect the role of committees’ gen-
der composition. Overall, we cannot reject that the estimates for both countries
are statistically similar, but we observe a significant difference in the behavior of
committees evaluating applications to full professor positions. In Italy, a larger
presence of men in the committee increases the chances of success of female ap-
plicants. On the contrary, in Spain female applicants to full professorships tend
to be relatively less successful when evaluated by an all-male committee. It is
unclear whether this difference reflects random sampling or whether it captures
some institutional or country-specific characteristic.27
Our analysis may be relevant for the design of policies aimed at increasing
the representation of women in the academic career. Several countries, including
Spain, have introduced quotas in scientific committees requiring the presence of
a minimum share of male and female evaluators. According to our results, in
general, a higher representation of women in scientific committees per se does
27Some authors have argued that the degree of transparency in an evaluation procedure can affect
gender biases (van den Brink, Benschop and Jansen, 2010). Hence, one possible explanation is that
the higher level of transparency and public scrutiny of the Italian system deterred male evaluators from
discriminating against female applicants to full professor positions.
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not increase the number of promoted female candidates, nor does it help candi-
dates who prove to be more productive in the future. Introducing gender quotas
indiscriminately might also have unintended consequences. Quotas may be detri-
mental for senior female researchers, who would have to spend a disproportionate
amount of time sitting on committees and, in some cases, for junior ones, whose
chances of success may be hindered.
To be sure, gender quotas could be desirable in certain cases. The analysis
suggests that the prevalence of gender segregation across subfields might be an
important determinant of whether female committee representation is likely to
help female candidates. We expect gender segregation to play a more important
role when evaluations are held at a more aggregate level than the one considered
here.28 Another important factor is the potential existence of connections between
evaluators and candidates. These connections, which tend to be gendered, are
likely to be more relevant in committees at the university- or department-level.
More empirical work is needed to understand the impact of gender quotas in
those contexts. Moreover, there are certain features of gender quotas that are
not captured by our analysis. Evaluators who are explicitly chosen to represent a
minority might behave differently, perhaps being more inclined to take a positive
view of candidates belonging to their own group. The introduction of quotas
may also affect the strategic incentives of evaluators. Nonetheless, keeping in
mind these limitations, our results cast doubts on a generalized implementation
of gender quotas in scientific committees.
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